The \u3ci\u3eConoco\u3c/i\u3e Decision:  Exclusive Review of Foreign-Trade Zones Board Determinations by the U.S. Court of International Trade by Heilferty, Robert J.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 20
Issue 3
Selected Articles from the United States Court of
International Trade Ninth Judicial Conference
Article 3
1-1-1995
TheConocoDecision: Exclusive Review of Foreign-
Trade Zones Board Determinations by the U.S.
Court of International Trade
Robert J. Heilferty
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Heilferty, The Conoco Decision: Exclusive Review of Foreign-Trade Zones Board Determinations by the U.S. Court of International
Trade, 20 Brook. J. Int'l L. 563 (1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol20/iss3/3
THE CONOCO DECISION: EXCLUSIVE
REVIEW OF FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES
BOARD DETERMINATIONS BY THE U.S.
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Robert J. Heilferty*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently re-
solved an issue of first impression regarding whether exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals of Foreign-Trade Zones Board (FTZ
Board) determinations lay with district courts or the Court of
International Trade (CIT).' In deciding that the CIT possessed
exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit reasoned that foreign
trade zones matters have a sufficient nexus with U.S. import
laws to be encompassed by the CIT's jurisdictional statute. The
decision will serve to eliminate existing uncertainty as to the
appropriate venue for challenging actions of the FTZ Board.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES PROGRAM
Pursuant to the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934,2 as
amended (FTZ Act),3 the FTZ Board is authorized to review
and approve applications for the establishment, operation and
maintenance of foreign trade zones (FTZs). FTZs are located in
designated "ports of entry" within the geographic boundaries of
the United States but are not considered part of U.S. territory
for formal customs entry purposes.4 A brief description of the
nature and purpose of this FTZ program, and its administra-
tion by the FTZ Board, provides useful background for under-
standing the Federal Circuit's Conoco decision.
* Robert Heilferty is an attorney in the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Department of Commerce. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author.
1. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-397, 48 Stat 998 (1934)
3. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 81a-u (West Supp. 1994).
4. Customs ports of entry are described at 19 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1994). "Cus-
toms territory of the United States" is defined as only the States, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 19 C.F.R. § 101.1(e) (1994).
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A. Foreign Trade Zones
1. Purpose
Created for the purpose of expediting and encouraging
foreign commerce, FTZs can provide substantial customs cost
savings to international trade-oriented corporations which
participate in the FTZ program. These savings have fueled
growth in the FTZ program which has been well-documented
during the last twenty-five years.
Potential customs savings come in a variety of forms.'
When foreign merchandise is admitted into an FTZ, it does so
without the immediate payment of duties and with a minimum
of paperwork by the Customs Service. A firm may elect to hold
imported merchandise in an FTZ until needed, realizing a cash
flow benefit by deferring duty payment. In certain jurisdic-
tions, payment of state and local taxes can be deferred or
avoided altogether.
Moreover, foreign goods that are admitted into an FTZ but
subsequently exported are not subject to duties, eliminating
the need for costly duty drawback procedures.6  Also,
antidumping and countervailing duties (for which duty draw-
back is unavailable)7 are not applied to re-exported merchan-
dise.' In addition, merchandise re-exported from a zone will
not be charged against any applicable import quotas.
Finally, FTZ status permits the corporate user to reduce
its customs duty liability in several circumstances? For exam-
ple, customs duties can be reduced on foreign goods that are
imported into FTZs, subjected to further manufacture and/or
processing, and subsequently introduced into the customs terri-
tory. These finished goods very often will be dutiable at a low-
er rate where so-called "inverted tariffs" are involved (i.e.,
where the tariff on the finished product is lower than the tariff
5. See generally Donald E. deKieffer & George W. Thompson, Political and
Policy Dimensions of Foreign Trade Zones: Expansion or the Beginning of the
End?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 492-99 (1985).
6. 19 U.S.C.A. § 81c (West Supp. 1994).
7. Id. § 1677h.
8. 15 C.F.R. § 400.33(b)(2) (1994) (restrictions on manufacturing and process-
ing activity).
9. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Mfg., U.S.A. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade
737, 738 (1988), affd, 884 F.2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Among other benefits,
[FTZs] often permit an importer to lessen its liability for duties . . ").
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applicable to the components of the finished good). In indus-
tries where import penetration is high, FTZ status enables
domestic producers to compete in the U.S. market against
foreign producers that are able to import the finished product
at a lower tariff rate.10
2. General-Purpose Zones and Special-Purpose Subzones
There are two categories of FTZ: general-purpose zones
and special-purpose subzones. Provided certain technical crite-
ria are met, each port of entry is entitled to a general-purpose
zone, typically administered by a public corporation such as a
port authority or local economic development agency."
Subzones may be established to accommodate individual opera-
tions, including manufacturing facilities, that cannot reason-
ably be accommodated within the general-purpose zone site.
12
Subzones are technically subordinate parts of the general-pur-
pose zone with which they are affiliated, and are usually single
manufacturing plants administered by individual corporations
under an agreement with the grantee/operator of the general-
purpose zone. Subzones are typically used for the assembly or
manufacture of imported parts and components into finished
goods.
B. Role of the FTZ Board
The FTZ Board is composed of the Secretaries of the De-
partment of Commerce, Treasury, and the Army, or their des-
ignated alternates, with the Secretary of Commerce acting as
the FTZ Board's chairperson. 3 The FTZ Board operates as an
interagency committee with members viewing decisions in light
of their respective jurisdictional responsibilities and areas of
10. Indeed, the significance of FTZs in reducing customs costs on imports of
foreign components used by domestic plants is reflected in statistics compiled by
the FTZ Board. For example, the FTZ Board's 1992 Annual Report revealed that a
full eighty-eight percent of merchandise received in all FTZs was not exported, but
was imported for domestic consumption. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONEs BD. 54TH ANN.
REP. App. D (1992).
11. 19 U.S.C-A. § 81b(b) (West Supp. 1994).
12. See 15 C.F.R. § 400. 2 (p) (1992) (definition of subzone). References are to
the FTZ Board's Regulations as revised in 1991. These regulations codify prior
interpretations and decisions of the Board under the FTZ Act and Regulations. See
Final Rule: Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,790 (1991).
13. 15 C.F.R. § 400.2(b) (1994).
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expertise. 4 Import Administration, within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, provides the FTZ Board with support staff.
FTZs are established as a public service and may not con-
flict with trade and tariff policy.15 The FTZ Board and Cus-
toms share responsibility for monitoring zone activity, with
Customs supervising the day-to-day operation of FTZs. 16 In
addition, the FTZ program has been the subject of executive
and legislative scrutiny as the use of zones and subzones for
manufacturing has increased since the early 1980s. Of chief
concern has been whether and under what conditions the con-
duct of manufacturing activity for importation under zone
procedures-typically involving the selection of lower duty
rates-is in the public interest. Two congressional committees
held hearings in the late 1980s. 7 In addition, both the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the International Trade
Commission (ITC) conducted a number of studies on the FTZ
program at the request of Congress. 8 As a consequence, the
FTZ Board increased its scrutiny of zone operations using
"inverted tariffs," and enacted new provisions on monitoring.9
14. The Commerce Department takes the lead on economic and industry im-
pact issues. The Department of the Treasury's main responsibilities involve the en-
forcement of customs laws and the supervision of zone activity. The Department of
the Army is involved through its Corps of Engineers, which advises the FTZ
Board on land use and environmental matters when they exist.
15. 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(b)(1) (1994).
16. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 146.3 (1994).
17. See Operation of the Foreign Trade Zones Program: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989); Foreign Trade Zones: Hearing before the Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
18. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-89-85, UPDATE TO MARCH
1984 REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF THE FOREIGN TRADE
ZONES (1989); INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. No. 2059, THE IMPLICATIONS OF
FOREIGH-TRADE ZONES FOR U.S. INDUSTRIES AND FOR COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS
BETWEEN U.S. AND FOREIGN FIRMS (1989); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-
84-52, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (1984). These reports have evaluated administration of the pro-
gram by the FTZ Board and have identified its various effects. For example, the
reduction in tariff revenue incurred as a result of subzone grants to the auto
industry was cited as a concern in the 1989 GAO report. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-89-85, supra, at 4.
19. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(b), (d) (1994).
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III. JURISDICTION OVER FTZ BOARD DETERMINATIONS
A. Judicial Review of International Trade Issues
In response to significant confusion as to the demarcation
between the jurisdiction of the federal district courts and the
U.S. Customs Court, Congress enacted the Customs Court Act
of 1980. This legislation sought to expand and clarify the juris-
diction of the newly-designated Court of International Trade
(CIT). As interpreted in subsequent cases, however, the Cus-
toms Court Act could not dispel many persistent questions
regarding jurisdiction.
1. Jurisdictional Issues Prior to
the Customs Court Act of 1980
Prior to 1980, there was significant confusion as to the
demarcation between jurisdiction of the federal district courts
and the U.S. Customs Court.2" The Customs Court's limited
subject matter jurisdiction and lack of equitable powers con-
tributed to this confusion. As a result, Congress moved to en-
act legislation which would clarify jurisdiction of international
trade matters so that plaintiffs could better discern the appro-
priate jurisdictional path.
2. The Customs Court Act of 1980
Pursuant to the Customs Court Act of 1980,21 the United
States Customs Court was renamed the United States Court of
International Trade. As Congress described it, the "major goal"
of the Customs Court Act was to:
re-emphasi[zel and clarif[y] ... Congress' intent that the
expertise and national jurisdiction of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade and Court of Appeals for International Trade,
Patents and Trademarks be exclusively utilized in the resolu-
tion of conflicts and disputes arising out of the tariff and
international trade laws, thereby eliminating the present
jurisdictional conflicts between these courts and the federal
20. See generally Velta Melnbrencis, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Sixth
Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International Trade, 131
F.R.D. 217, 226.
21. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.).
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district and appellate courts[.]22
The vehicle for attaining this objective was the residual
jurisdictional provision in the Customs Court Act which
states:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of
International Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and
subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of this
section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United
States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law
of the United States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importa-
tion of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of
revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the
importation of merchandise for reasons other than the pro-
tection of the public health and safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the
matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection
and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.'
The legislative history of this provision indicates an intent
to broaden the exclusive jurisdiction of the former Customs
Court:
Section 201 of H.R. 6394 added a new section 1581(i) to Title
28, United States Code, granting broad residual jurisdiction
to the United States Court of International Trade. This sec-
tion granted the court jurisdiction over those civil actions
which arise directly out of an import transaction and involve
one of the many international trade laws. The purpose of this
section was to eliminate the confusion which currently exists
22. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3739.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1988).
24. Id. Subsections (a) through (h) of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 pertain to the follow-
ing: (a) and (b) to customs protest; (c) to antidumping and countervailing duty pro-
ceedings; (d) to trade adjustment assistance; (e) to the Buy American Act; (f) to
confidential information; (g) to customs broker's licenses; and (h) to preimportation
rulings by Treasury. Former Chief Judge Edward D. Re has presented a compre-
hensive review of matters within the CIT's jurisdiction. See Hon. Edward D. Re,
Litigation Before the United States Court of International Trade, in 19 U.S.C.A., at
XIII (West Supp. 1994).
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as to the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts and the Court of International Trade. This
language made it clear that all suits of this type are properly
commenced only in the Court of International Trade and not
in a district court.2
In the Customs Court Act, Congress set out to clarify the
"considerable confusion by litigants and the courts" over
"whether or not a particular case comes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Customs Court and is, therefore, excluded
from the jurisdiction of the district courts." 6 It found that
"[t]he dismissal of these actions, after great Pxpenditures of
time and resources, has produced frustration on the part of
litigants and the courts."27
3. CIT Jurisdiction: Lingering Uncertainty
Unfortunately, passage of the Customs Court Act did not
clarify judicial review of international trade matters in the way
many had anticipated. In a series of cases, culminating in the
1987 Supreme Court decision in K-Mart v. Cartier,28 the juris-
dictional statute of the CIT was interpreted quite narrowly.
In K-Mart, the Supreme Court noted that "Congress did
not commit to the [CIT's] exclusive jurisdiction every suit
against the Government challenging custom-related laws and
regulations."2 9 In the wake of the K-Mart decision, the contin-
ued uncertainty as to the line of demarcation between federal
district courts and the CIT was plainly evident. It became
apparent that Congress had failed to meet one of its stated
goals, namely to: "[elliminate much of the difficulty experi-
enced by international trade litigants who in the past com-
menced suits in district courts only to have those suits dis-
missed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.""
25. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 22, at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.O.CA.N.
at 3745. But see id. at 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3759 ("Subsection (i)
is intended only to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court, and not to
create any new causes of action not founded on other provisions of law,").
26. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 22, at 30, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
at 3741.
27. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3741.
28. 485 U.S. 176 (1987).
29. Id. at 188.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 22, at 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Commentators have suggested that the CIT's narrowly
interpreted jurisdiction leaves the court ill-prepared to address
the increasing complexity of international trade litigation."'
And as the Honorable Gregory Carman of the CIT has noted,
the lingering uncertainty over the CIT jurisdictional mandate
extended to many substantive areas, including judicial review
of FTZ Board determinations. 2
B. Judicial Review of FTZ Board Determinations
With the exception of determinatidns to revoke zone sta-
tus, the FTZ Act does not specify which court has jurisdiction
to review FTZ Board determinations. Prior to 1980, FTZ mat-
ters had been reviewed by either the Customs Court, or a fed-
eral district court depending on the nature of the action. With
the enactment of the Customs Court Act of 1980, it remained
unclear whether district courts or the new CIT should review
FTZ Board determinations. With the Conoco decision, the Fed-
eral Circuit has now resolved this jurisdictional question in
favor of exclusive jurisdiction by the CIT. Further certainty on
this issue was provided by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit's subsequent concurrence in the Miami
Free Zone Corp. decision.3
1. The Judicial Review Provision of the FTZ Act
The FTZ Act provides only limited guidance regarding (1)
the actions of the FTZ Board that are reviewable, and (2) the
appropriate forum in which those decisions may be reviewed.
Specifically, judicial review is referred to only with respect to
revocation determinations.'
The lack of specificity in the FTZ Act regarding judicial
at 3759.
31. See, e.g., Andrew P. Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §
1581(i): A View from the Plaintiffs Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 793 (1984).
32. Hon. George W. Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of International
Trade: Remarks at the Conference on International Business Practice, 13 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 245, 256-57 (1992).
33. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 22 F.3d 1110 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 81r(c) (1988). Section 81r(c) provides that an FTZ Board order
which revokes FTZ status may be appealed to the court of appeals for the circuit
in which the relevant zone is located.
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CONOCO DECISION
review is perhaps understandable when one considers that
many provisions of the Act have remained unchanged since
they were drafted in 1934. During the early years of the FTZ
program, only a handful of zones were in operation and these
zones were limited in function. FTZ Board determinations were
infrequent and created little controversy.
Nevertheless, the failure of the Act to address judicial
review more specifically eventually caught up with the FTZ
Board. During the last thirty years, more and more FTZs were
activated with increasingly sophisticated operations. Inevita-
bly, disputes arose which resulted in litigation.
2. Judicial Review of FTZ Board
Determinations Prior to 1980
During the life of the FTZ program, legal challenges to
FTZ Board determinations have been quite infrequent. Prior to
1980, only one court action-in federal district
court-specifically reviewed a FTZ Board determination. In
Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans,35 the plaintiff, a domestic steel
producer, sought reversal of an FTZ Board order granting
subzone status for a shipyard. In affirming the district court's
approval of the FTZ Board determination, the Court of Appeals
noted that
Congress has delegated wide latitude of judgment to the
Foreign-Trade Zones Board to respond to and resolve the
changing needs of domestic and foreign commerce through
the trade zones concept. Because of the complexity and vaga-
ries of our highly developed systems of trade... it is impera-
tive that the Board be permitted to experiment at the fringes
of the tariff laws.3"
Thus, there was early recognition of the FTZ Board's role in
the administration of the tariff laws.
Prior to 1980, the Customs Court did review the effect of
an FTZ determination upon duty liability of an oil refiner.
The plaintiff in that case styled its action as a protest of the
35. 303 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. 431 F.2d at 788.
37. Hawaiian Independent Refinery v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1249 (Cust.
Ct. 1978).
1995]
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assessed duties, thereby securing jurisdiction by the Customs
Court based on the denial of the protest.
The Conoco case is the first FTZ Board determination to
be specifically reviewed by the CIT since its creation in 1980.
It was clear, however, that the CIT-as the Customs Court's
successor-had already developed a familiarity with the FTZ
concept38 and found itself required to interpret the FTZ
Act." Nevertheless, in the evolving demarcation between the
jurisdiction of the district courts and the CIT, the Conoco case
was a long anticipated ruling as to where FTZ Board determi-
nations belonged.
3. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Board"
a. Background
In 1986 and 1987, the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal
District (Lake Charles), grantee of general-purpose FTZ 87,
filed applications on behalf of Conoco, Inc. and Citgo Petroleum
Corporation for special-purpose subzones. Both Conoco and
Citgo sought foreign trade subzone status for their oil refinery
operations.
The FTZ Board ultimately concluded that approval of the
applications was in the public interest only if certain condi-
tions were imposed.41 First, the so-called "fuel consumed" con-
38. See, e.g., Miami Free Zone Corp. v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 526 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1993) (challenging Customs assessment of liquidated damages for vio-
lating FTZ operator conditions); Torrington v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 492 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1993) (applicability of antidumping duties to merchandise within FTZ);
Torrington v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 945 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) (applicability
of antidumping duties to merchandise within FTZ); Wear Me Apparel Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 636 F. Supp. 481 (Ct. Intl Trade 1986) (exclusion claim on merchandise
transferred to FTZ); Arbor Foods, Inc. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 1474 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985) (action involving blended sugar operation within FTZ).
39. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 388 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1990), affd, 945 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (drawback claim on mer-
chandise within FTZ); Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp., USA. v. United States, 12 Ct.
Int'l Trade 737 (1988), affd, 884 F.2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (FTZ benefits do not
apply to capital goods and equipment used or "consumed" within the zone because
goods were not being imported into the subzone for the purpose of being used in
one of the ways prescribed by the FTZ Act, but were instead to be consumed for
the production of other merchandise).
40. 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
41. Order Approving Application of Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Dis-
trict for Conoco Refinery at the Port of Lake Charles, in Calcasieu Parish, Louisi-
ana, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,455 (1988); Order Approving Application for Citgo Refinery at
572 [Vol. XX:3
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dition required that both Conoco and Citgo pay duties on for-
eign crude used as fuel (or refined as products used as fuel) in
their refineries. Second, the "no inverted tariff benefit" condi-
tion required that both zone operations elect "privileged foreign
status" for imported foreign crude oil. By electing privileged
foreign status, Conoco and Citgo would be foregoing any "in-
verted tariff' benefits that stem from lower duty rates applica-
ble to refined products.42
b. The District Court Decision
In July 1989, Conoco, Citgo, and Lake Charles filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. In their complaint, the parties argued
that the conditions imposed by the FTZ Board were arbitrary
and capricious. The Government moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that juris-
diction of such matters rested exclusively with the CIT pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1988). The district court agreed that
the CIT possessed exclusive jurisdiction and dismissed the
complaint without prejudice.43
c. The CIT Decision
In June 1990, plaintiffs commenced an action before the
CIT, containing allegations identical to those made in district
court. Plaintiffs claimed that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction
to review the FTZ Board determination based on the residual
jurisdiction provision." The Government defended on the
merits, and raised the additional claim that the FTZ Act did
not provide for judicial review of FTZ Board determinations. In
1992, the CIT, per Judge Carman, ultimately ruled that
§ 1581(i) of the CIT's jurisdictional statute did not provide for
review of FTZ Board determinations.45 The Court ruled that
plaintiffs could not rely on the residual jurisdiction provision
the Port of Lake Charles, in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana 54 Fed. Reg. 27,660
(1989).
42. See discussion of the inverted tariff concept supra Section II.A.1.
43. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., Civil Action No.
89-1717-LC (W.D. La. 1990).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1), (4) (1988).
45. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 790 F. Supp. 279
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
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because they had not demonstrated that the remedy provided
under a specific jurisdictional grant-specifically, the filing of a
customs protest-was manifestly inadequate.46
d. The Federal Circuit Decision
Conoco's subsequent appeal provided the Federal Circuit
with an opportunity to resolve an issue of first impression and,
at the same time, resolve the lingering uncertainty over judi-
cial review of FTZ Board determinations. In its March 1994
decision, the Federal Circuit rejected the Government's argu-
ment that judicial review was precluded and ruled that the
CIT did possess exclusive jurisdiction over FTZ Board determi-
nations.
The Federal Circuit's analysis of the CIT's jurisdictional
statute made reference to the relevant legislative history. Con-
gress, the court noted, sought to provide the CIT with broad
jurisdiction "over any civil action against the United States
arising out of the federal statutes governing import transac-
tions." 7 The Federal Circuit also noted Congress' intent that
existing confusion as to the subject matter jurisdiction of dis-
trict courts and the CIT be eliminated, so that litigants could
avoid having actions dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.48
The Federal Circuit identified two provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581 as potential sources of jurisdiction: subsection (a),
which provides for review of a denial of a customs protest, and
subsection (i), which provides for a residual grant of jurisdic-
tion. In the Court's view, however, plaintiffs remedy under
subsection (a) was manifestly inadequate, insofar as it required
plaintiff to initiate a customs protest proceeding in order to
collaterally attack a determination of the FTZ Board.49
By analyzing the plain language of subsection (i) of the
statute, the Federal Circuit concluded that
46. Id. at 282, 285-88. The Court did express its sense of frustration with this
result and stated that the "restrictive statutory scheme of § 1581(a)-(h) and its
relationship to § 1581(i) should be re-examined." Id. at 289.
47. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581,
1586, (citing H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 22, at 21, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3732).
48. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 22, at 47, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3759).
49. Id. at 1587-88.
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[t]he language of subsection (i) granting to the Court of Inter-
national Trade "exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action...
that arises out of any law of the United States providing
for-," when coupled with the phrases in paragraph (i)(1)
relating to "revenue from imports or tonnage" would seem
easily to embrace the matters appellants raise here.50
Thus, the Federal Circuit was able to establish a sufficient
nexus between FTZ Board determinations and the specific
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
The Federal Circuit's opinion in the Conoco decision an-
swered the question as to whether the CIT was vested with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to review FTZ Board determinations. But
in truth, the Conoco decision addressed only one side of the
question. How would federal district courts rule when faced
with a FTZ Board determination? More importantly, would
federal appellate courts disagree with the Federal Circuit and
cause a split among the circuits? It was the D.C. Circuit's Mi-
ami Free Zone Corp. decision-which concurred with the
Conoco decision-which effectively resolved these questions.
4. Miami Free Zone Corp. v.
United States Foreign Trade Zones Board5
a. Background
At the center of this dispute was the FTZ Board's ability to
authorize more than one general-purpose zone in a port of
entry if it determines that the existing zone(s) do not ade-
quately serve the convenience of commerce.52 In 1991, the
FTZ Board approved the application of the Wynwood Commu-
nity Economic Development Corporation (Wynwood) for an
additional zone in the Miami port of entry. Plaintiff Miami
Free Zone Corp., the private operator of the original FTZ in
Miami, challenged the grant of authority in federal district
court. The district court subsequently granted the
government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, ruling that the CIT had exdusive jurisdiction under § 1581(i).
50. Id. at 1588.
51. 803 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1994).
52. 19 U.S.C. § 81b(b) (1988).
53. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 803 F. Supp. 442
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b. The D.C. Circuit Decision
In its ruling on the appeal, the D.C. Circuit ultimately
concurred with the Federal Circuit's Conoco decision, though
differing slightly in its emphasis.54 The D.C. Circuit found it
necessary to rely upon § 1581(i)(4), concluding that the FTZ
Act-by granting an exemption from tariffs and duties on for-
eign merchandise-provides for the administration of such
tariffs and duties." As a result, the residual jurisdiction pro-
vision was found to contain a jurisdictional grant which was
sufficiently broad to encompass review of FTZ Board determi-
nations. The court admitted that the question was a close one
but emphasized the value of uniform judicial review of FTZ
Board matters and its preference that a circuit conflict be
avoided."
IV. CONCLUSION
The full implications of the Conoco and the Miami Free
Zone Corp. decisions for other areas of international trade
litigation are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the
decisions have resolved the lingering question regarding judi-
cial review of FTZ Board determinations. In this sense, the
decisions have interpreted the CIT's jurisdictional statute in a
way that eliminates the confusion which existed for litigants
seeking to challenge FTZ Board determinations.
(D.D.C. 1994).
54. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 22 F.3d 1110 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 1112-13.
56. Id. at 1113.
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